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The Telecoms Boom and Bust 1996 to 2002 has had a significant impact on the 
structure of the Telecommunications Industry.  During the boom it seemed as if new 
entrant telecoms operators, entering on the back of new technologies, might even 
replace the incumbent operators such as Telecom Italia, Deutsche Telekom and France 
Telecom.  But the bust has decisively reversed this tendency.  The aim of this paper is to 
examine in detail some of the major recent changes that have taken place in Telecom 
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The study of Telecom Italia, Italy’s incumbent telecoms operator, provides important 
insights into the dynamics of the Telecoms Industry in this one of Europe’s largest four 
countries.  However, in studying Telecom Italia we learn far more than only about 
telecoms.  The study also provides an important insight into the process of capital 
accumulation in Italy and into the way in which financial institutions work in this 
country, a modus operandi that is very different from the other large European 
countries, namely Britain, France and Germany.  To be more specific, in July 2001 two 
Italian businessmen, from two large established Italian companies, succeeded in 
spending Euro 7 billion in cash in order to acquire Telecom Italia, a company with a 
market capitalisation at the time of Euro 55 billion.  How was this possible?  What does 
it tell us about the Italian telecoms industry and financial institutions?  From the 
perspective of Telecom Italia itself, what are the company’s main activities including its 
advanced services, in Italy itself as well as elsewhere; how is the company organised; 
what is its strategy; and what does the future hold for it?  These are the kinds of 
questions with which this paper is concerned. 
 
 
TELECOM ITALIA’S COMPLICATED  
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
 
Telecom Italia was created in August 1994.  It became the monopoly public telecoms 
service provider in Italy through the merger of five telecoms companies that were 
operators in the areas of long-distance services, domestic services, international 
services, maritime services, and satellite services.  On July 18, 1997 the five companies 
were merged into their holding company, STET (Società Finanziaria Telefonica), which 
then changed its name to Telecom Italia.  In November 1997, the Italian Treasury 
privatised Telecom Italia, selling almost all of its stake in the company through an 
Italian public offering and separate international and US public offerings.  In addition, 
the Treasury sold shares in Telecom Italia to a small group of wealthy private 
shareholders and approximately 1.5 million Italians also bought shares in the company. 
 
 
Privatisation to May 1999 
 
The principal architect of the privatisation of Telecom Italia was its Chairman-to-be, 
Guido Rossi.  However, Rossi resigned in 1998 after a dispute with the company’s 
CEO, Tomaso Tommasi, over new corporate governance rules that Rossi was 
attempting to introduce.
2  The new Chairman was Gian Mario Rossignolo, formerly 
Chairman of the Italian white goods company, Zanussi.  He scrapped the post of CEO, 
turning himself into a powerful executive chairman.  However, he too soon resigned 
when news was leaked regarding Telecom Italia’s poor performance.  In October 1998, 
Telecom Italia’s share price was 19 percent below the offer price paid by Italian retail 
investors.  The next Chairman was Franco Bernabè, a former economics professor who 
had transformed ENI, the Italian oil company, from a struggling state company into the 
world’s seventh-largest oil operator.  However, Bernabè had his share of troubles too in 
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attempting to turn Telecom Italia round.  As a result of the problems the company’s 
institutional investors abstained during the formal vote on its 1997 accounts.  The 
Economist commented that, “Since its privatisation in 1997 Telecom Italia has 
floundered.  It has no convincing strategy and it has discarded senior executives and 




The Olivetti Take-Over 
 
Clearly, Telecom Italia was ripe for take-over.  But who would want to take over a 
large, sprawling, bureaucratic company that was already in serious difficulty?  Had this 
question been asked at the time of Telecom Italia’s privatisation in 1997, few would 
have come up with Olivetti as an answer.  Only eighteen months earlier, Olivetti had 
been on the brink of collapse and required government funding to survive.  Yet in 
February 1999 Olivetti launched a hostile take-over bid, the biggest in European 
corporate history, in competition with the German incumbent, Deutsche Telekom, that 
also had its eye on the weakened Telecom Italia and had already begun preliminary 
merger talks with the Italian company.  In June 1999, Olivetti’s bid succeeded, resulting 





Olivetti, now Italy’s largest telecoms company, was one of the country’s industrial 
success stories.  Founded in 1908 by Camillo Olivetti in Ivrea, to the north-west of 
Turin, Olivetti was Italy’s first typewriter factory.  In 1933, Adriano Olivetti, Camillo’s 
son, became head of the company and succeeded in rapidly expanding its activities.  
Olivetti soon diversified its products into electrical typewriters, calculators, and 
numerical controls.  Under Adriano’s leadership Olivetti became in the 1950s one of the 
European leaders in the field of electro-mechanical office products.  Evidence both of 
Olivetti’s strength and its increasing globalisation was the company’s acquisition of 
Underwood in 1959, one of the leading US typewriter manufacturers. 
 
The late 1950s was also the time of one of Olivetti’s greatest challenges as the electro-
mechanical paradigm gave way to the microelectronics paradigm.  Olivetti attempted to 
adapt to this radical change in its operating environment and in 1959 produced the Elea 
9003, Italy’s first electronic computer.  However, after Adriano Olivetti’s death in 1960, 
the difficulties that the company faced in its attempt to make the technological 
paradigmatic leap began to surface in the form of a series of financial crises.  These 
crises forced Olivetti to sell its Electronics Division.  However, work in the company on 
electronics continued and in 1965 Olivetti produced its P101, a programmable desktop 
computer that was a precursor to the Personal Computer.  In the 1970s Olivetti poured 
more of its resources into electronics, efforts that led to a series of serious financial 
crises by the end of the decade. 
 
In 1978 the Italian financier, Carlo De Benedetti, made a significant investment in the 
company and took over its management.  In 1978 Olivetti produced its first electronic 
typewriter and in 1982 introduced its first PC, a year after IBM.  This period marked an 
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era of accelerated growth for Olivetti as it entered more broadly into the IT products 
field and also began providing IT services.  In 1983 Olivetti made one of its first forays 
into telecoms with an alliance with AT&T, through its Western Electric subsidiary one 
of the largest telecoms equipment companies in the US.  In order to attempt to enter the 
European telecoms equipment market, a market still dominated by national champions 
such as Siemens in Germany and GEC and Plessey in the UK, AT&T established 
alliances with Philips in the Netherlands and Olivetti in Italy.  This experience gave the 
Italian firm a taste of the telecoms industry that was to witness rapid growth with its 
adoption of digital switching technologies and with the increasing liberalisation of 
telecoms services from the latter half of the 1980s.
4 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, after a period of increasingly damaging global 
competition in its main IT products markets, Olivetti made the crucial path-breaking 
strategic decision to enter the telecoms services market.  Together with some global 
telecoms operators, Olivetti established Omnitel, a mobile operator, that began 
commercial services at the end of 1995.  Also in 1995, following similar strategic 
thinking, Olivetti established Infostrada, a fixed-line operator.  With its new activities in 
telecoms services leading the way, Olivetti, strongly pressurised by increased 
competitive pressures in both the Italian and the global IT markets, began a process of 
costly restructuring. 
 
This restructuring process was led by Roberto Colaninno, who became CEO of Olivetti 
in September 1996.  Colaninno, trained as an accountant, began his career in the car 
parts industry, rising to become CEO at a company called Fiamm.  In 1981, held by a 
British holding company, Fiamm was bought out through Sogefi, a finance firm in 
which Carlo De Benedetti was involved.  De Benedetti later became Chairman of 
Olivetti and after he did he recruited Colaninno, who had developed a good reputation 
in the areas of financial engineering and restructuring, to become the firm’s CEO. 
 
In 1997 Colaninno established an alliance with Mannesmann, the German engineering 
company that, like Olivetti, had made the strategic decision to move out of its existing 
markets and enter the telecoms market.  In the same year, as part of the same 
restructuring process, Olivetti sold its personal computer division to the Taiwanese firm, 
Acer and the following year sold its systems and services operation.  However, Olivetti 
retained a presence in office products, specialised systems, and IT services in the Italian 






Olivetti’s Bid for Telecom Italia 
 
Encouraged by his move into telecoms and successful restructuring, Colaninno in 
February 1999 launched an audacious hostile bid for Telecom Italia.  Not only was this 
the first time that an incumbent telecoms operator from one of the large industrialised 
countries had been confronted by a hostile predator.  This was also the biggest hostile 
take-over bid in European corporate history.  Not surprisingly, Bernabè with the support 
                                                 
4   See M. Fransman,  Japan’s Computer and Communications Industry, Oxford University Press, 1995, 
for a detailed discussion of telecoms switching and liberalisation.  
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of the board of Telecom Italia decided to resist.  For some time already, it later 
emerged, secret talks had been underway between Telecom Italia and Deutsche 
Telekom regarding a possible merger.  Had the merger been completed, it would have 
created Europe’s largest telecoms company with around 300,000 employees and a 
market capitalisation at the time of about $175 billion, although some critics remained 
skeptical regarding the future prospects for two merged lumbering, bureaucratic giants. 
 
Deutsche Telekom, however, was not to succeed in its role of White Knight.  In April 
1999 Olivetti made an offer for 5.1 billion Telecom Italia shares at a price of $12.20 per 
share.  Although this offer was lower than Deutsche Telekom’s offer, it was mainly in 
cash.  In May the Olivetti offer was accepted with the deal, valued at $34 billion, being 
finalised in June when Olivetti took ownership of 54.96 percent of Telecom Italia’s 
shares. 
 
The deal had important consequences, both within Italy and beyond.  In the short term, 
in order to comply with anti-trust regulations, Olivetti was forced to sell both Omnitel 
and Infostrada, its mobile and fixed operators respectively, to its ally Mannesmann.  
(Omnitel, currently Italy’s second largest mobile operator, was later acquired by 
Vodafone after it took over Mannesmann.  In 2001, Infostrada merged with Wind, 
currently Italy’s third mobile operator that had been established by Enel, the Italian 
electricity company, France Telecom and Deutsche Telekom
5.)   Unintentionally, the 
deal also resulted in the breakup of the Deutsche Telekom-France Telecom alliance and 
its Global One joint venture, jointly owned with Sprint of the US.  The fallout between 
Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom became inevitable once it emerged that Ron 
Sommer, CEO of the former company, had entered into secret negotiations with 
Telecom Italia without informing his supposed ally, Michel Bon of France Telecom.  




In the longer term the takeover of Telecom Italia by Olivetti was to have important 
implications for the structure of the Italian telecoms Industry, although this was not 
apparent at the time.  In order to understand the longer term consequences it is 





The Financial Structuring of Olivetti’s Control 
 
In order to gain control of Telecom Italia, a company far larger than Olivetti, Colaninno 
and his advisers established a pyramid of holding companies.  This financial structure 
served the main purpose of allowing Olivetti, and a small group of investors who had 
been persuaded by Colaninno regarding the merits of the investment, to control 
Telecom Italia by purchasing only a minority of its shares. 
 
The financial structure of the deal is shown in Exhibit 1. 
 
                                                 
5   See below for further details on the Italian mobile industry. 
6 See the author’s papers on Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom for more information on the 





Exhibit 1.  The Financial Structuring  











                                                                                        























As shown in Exhibit 1, Colaninno and his allies created two investment companies, 
Hopa and Fingruppo.  These two companies owned 55 percent of a third holding 
company, Bell.  In turn, Bell owned 23 percent of Olivetti.  Although Bell was a 
minority shareholder in Olivetti, it was the largest single shareholder that gave it 
effective control of Olivetti.  (Under Italy’s Draghi Law that deals with takeovers, a 
bidder is allowed to acquire less than 30 percent of the equity of a company without 
having to make a full offer for the remaining shares.  This requirement is similar to the 
takeover law in the UK.  The effect was that Colaninno and his associates were able to 
exercise effective control over Olivetti while holding only a controlling minority share 











Telecom Italia  
 
6
Olivetti held a 55 percent majority holding in Telecom Italia giving the company full 
control. 
 
In this way, Colaninno and Olivetti were able to successfully implement their takeover 
that was to change the face of the Italian telecoms industry with ramifications in other 
key parts of the European industry.  However, to anticipate the rest of our story, the 




Telecom Italia Under Colaninno 
 
How did Telecom Italia, struggling to find a viable role for itself before the Olivetti 
takeover, fare under Colaninno?  The short answer is not very well.  In part, the reason 
is that the financial structure that Colaninno and his advisers carefully constructed 
created many further problems. 
 
One major problem resulted from attempts to handle the debt that resulted from the 
Olivetti takeover of Telecom Italia.  In total Olivetti took on an additional debt burden 
of approximately $16 billion, much of which accumulated in Tecnost, the Olivetti 
subsidiary that was used as one of the main takeover vehicles.  The problem, however, 
was that most of the free cash flow of the new company existed further down the 
‘Chinese Boxes’, in Telecom Italia and even more so in its mobile subsidiary Telecom 
Italia Mobile.  This raised the difficulty of creating an acceptable mechanism for 
mobilising the free cash flow in Telecom Italia and Telecom Italia Mobile in order to 
pay the debts that had accumulated in Tecnost. 
 
The attempt to mobilise this cash, however, ran into a further difficulty that was a direct 
consequence of Colaninno’s attempt at financial engineering.  This difficulty emerged 
because Colannino’s takeover process, and its benefits, incorporated only a minority of 
Olivetti’s and Telecom Italia’s shareholders. As already noted in Exhibit 1, Colaninno 
and his colleagues exercisted control over Bell which in turn controlled Olivetti with 
only 23 percent of its shares.  Furthermore, Olivetti controlled Telecom Italia with only 
55 percent of the latter’s shares.  This created the problem of minority shareholders, 
particularly the non-voting holders of so-called savings shares who did not need to be 
consulted and partly as a result frequently failed to benefit.   
 
These difficulties soon became apparent.  Shortly after he assumed his new post in 
Telecom Italia, Colannino came up with a plan aimed at reducing some of Tecnost’s 
debt burden.  In essence this involved transferring control of Telecom Italia Mobile 
(TIM) to Tecnost, thereby allowing it to benefit from TIM’s cash flow. (With the rapid 
uptake of mobile services at the time the mobile sector became the most important 
generator of both revenue and profit, not only for Telecom Italia but also for all the 
other incumbent telecoms operators
7).  In return, Telecom Italia’s minority shareholders 
would be offered Tecnost shares, with the price they were to pay being used to reduce 
the debt. 
 
                                                 




This proposal, however, ran into strong opposition from the minority shareholders who 
felt that it ran counter to their interests.  In this they were supported by some of the 
quality financial press.  For example, The Economist called the proposal, judged from a 
shareholders’ perspective, “downright insulting”.
8 The Financial Times went even 
further: “If Mr Colaninno does not have the resources to run TI without abusing 
minorities, he should sell it to someone who does”.
9 
 
Some minority shareholders voted with their feet. For example, IFIL, an Italian 
investment company closely linked to Fiat
10, sold its entire stake in Telecom Italia, 
widely interpreted as a protest at the way minority shareholders were being treated.  
Moreover, with the recent globalisation of Italian financial markets foreign investment 
companies were establishing a foothold in Italian equities.  For instance, global 
investors such as Fidelity International and Merrill Lynch were also shareholders in 
Telecom Italia Mobile.  As a result of the pressure, Colannino was forced to withdraw 
his financial restructuring proposal.  However, at this time Telecom Italia’s share price 
was holding up, benefiting from the favourable light in which telecoms shares were 
regarded by investors and this helped to dampen criticism of Colaninno.
11 
 
But Colaninno’s luck was not to last.  In early 2001, Colaninno came up with another 
proposal.  Telecom Italia’s shareholders with non-voting shares were to be offered the 
opportunity to purchase more expensive voting shares.  The premium would allow 
Olivetti to cut its debt by about a third.  Had the $10 billion deal gone through, this 
would have reduced Olivetti’s share in Telecom Italia to about 40 percent, down from 
its current 55 percent.  However, this proposal was also opposed by activist 
shareholders who felt that it benefited Olivetti significantly more than Telecom Italia.  
A more objective measure of the relative benefits was provided by the market price of 
the non-voting shares relative to that of the ordinary voting shares.  Between the 
privatisation of Telecom Italia in November 1997 and Olivetti’s bid for the company in 
February 1999 the non-voting shares traded on average at a 31 percent discount to the 
voting shares.  However, from the time of Olivetti’s bid to February 2001 the discount 
had widened to 49 percent, implying that the non-voting shares had become relatively 
less attractive.  This led the Financial Times to comment that, “Telecom Italia [non-
voting] savings shares have traded at distress levels on fears of abuse.”
12  Responding to 
the offer, a group of fifty fund managers, led by the British hedge fund, Liverpool 




Colaninno’s misfortunes were compounded by three further events.  The first hit 
Telecom Italia in April 2001 when the Italian antitrust authorities fined the company 
$60 million for abuse of its dominant market position.  The second occurred in April 
and May 2001 when two board members of Telecom Italia resigned after alleging that 
                                                 
8   The Economist, October 9
th, 1999. 
9   Financial Times, May 24
th 2000. 
10  As is shown later, Fiat, controlled by the Agnelli family, was part of a political-financial grouping that 
opposed Colaninno and his allies. 
11  If there was a silver lining to the storm-cloud Colannino had created over Olivetti and Telecom Italia it 
was that, apprehensive of its high level of debt, Telecom Italia was more reticent than its leading 
European incumbent counterparts in forking out money for expensive third-generation mobile licenses, a 
reticence that would later reward the company at least in comparative terms. 
12   Financial Times, February 6
th, 2001. 
13   Financial Times, February 7
th, 2001.  
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Colaninno had misled the board by failing to declare his interests as the company’s 
corporate governance procedures required him to do.  The gravity of this claim was 
enhanced when it was announced at the beginning of July that a Turin magistrate would 
investigate Colannino and several board members in connection with possible conflict 
of interest. 
 
The subject of the allegations was the purchase in 2000 by Telecom Italia’s Tin.it, its 
internet service provider, of Seat Pagine Gialle, an on-line directories company, for 
Euro 9.5 billion.  The problem was that both Colaninno and Emilio Gnutti, a director of 
Telecom Italia, were shareholders in the investment company, Hopa (the company that 
was used as a takeover vehicle in Olivetti’s takeover of Telecom Italia – see Exhibit 1.)  
Hopa was involved in the Seat acquisition.  Although Colaninno and Gnutti did not 
directly benefit, Hopa made a capital gain of Euro 129 million from the deal.  However, 
Colaninno and Gnutti failed to inform the Telecom Italia board of their interest in the 
deal for two board meetings after the deal was announced.  It was only at the third 
meeting, after questions had begun to be asked, that they informed the board of their 
interest and agreed to abstain from voting. 
 
The third misfortune, not entirely of Colaninno’s or Telecom Italia’s making, was the 
company’s steadily falling share price.  In June 2001 Credit Suisse First Boston 
predicted that Telecom Italia’s net profits would fall by 14 percent to $1.5 billion during 
2001 and the company share price continued to slide.   
 
It is tempting to suggest that Telecom Italia’s falling share price was more a reflection 
of the sentiment in global financial markets that had turned markedly against the 
telecoms sector, than an indication of the company’s own performance.  And it certainly 
is true that by July 2001 the share prices of the leading European incumbent telecoms 
operators had declined markedly.  However, it is also the case that judged over a five-
year period, Telecom Italia’s share price had fallen by significantly more than its 
European counterparts.  This is evident from Exhibit 2. 
 
 
Exhibit 2.  The Share-Price of Telecom Italia 
and its European Counterparts,  
five-year change to September 2001 
 
 




















Once again, therefore, as in the period immediately preceding the bids made by Olivetti 
and Deutsche Telekom, Telecom Italia and its leader found themselves in a vulnerable 
position.  This vulnerability was increased by two further considerations. 
 
The first consideration was that the constellation of political and financial forces in Italy 
had changed significantly, to the detriment of Colaninno.  In 1997 Colaninno had 
succeeded in winning the support of the centre-left Prime Minister of Italy, Massimo 
D’Alema, in his takeover battle for Telecom Italia.  However, in 2001, a new right-wing 
Prime Minister had just taken over, Silvio Berlusconi.  Furthermore, Enrico Cuccia, the 
powerful head of the Italian bank Mediobanca, who had supported Colaninno, had just 
died.  Mediobanca had been involved in a conflict with the Agnelli family that controls 
Fiat.  The Agnellis had just managed to outflank Mediobanca and obtain control of the 
important Italian company, Montedison




The second consideration that also increased the vulnerability of Colaninno and Olivetti 
was equally important.  Ironically, the very financial structure that Colaninno and his 
allies had created in order to assert their control over Telecom Italia was susceptible to 
use by a predator focused on Colaninno and Olivetti as its prey.   
 
 
The Pirelli-Benetton Take-Over 
 
Just as Olivetti under Colaninno had seen the acquisition of Telecom Italia as an 
opportunity to diversify into what was perceived as the more profitable market of 
telecoms services
16 – and out of markets such as IT products – so two other Italian 
companies perceived the same opportunity.  The first was Pirelli. 
 
Like Olivetti, Pirelli had a long history in the Italian industrial sector.  The company 
was founded by a twenty-four year old engineer, Giovanni Battista Pirelli, in 1872.  
Pirelli & C. was established in Milan as a general rubber goods factory.  It was its 
competencies in rubber processing that shaped the company’s evolution.  By the end of 
the Nineteenth Century, Pirelli was manufacturing insulated telegraph wires, submarine 
telegraph cables, and bicycle tyres.  The company’s first passenger car tyre was made in 
1901.  Pirelli also used its competencies to facilitate the process of globalisation of its 
business.  By 1917 it had opened cable factories in Spain, Britain, and Argentina and 
this international expansion continued through the Second World War and afterwards.  
Tyres and cables continued to be Pirelli’s main business areas.  In 1971 Pirelli entered 
                                                 
14 The Montedison group gets around 70 percent of its sales from its share in companies that produce 
sugars and starches, animal feed, oilseed, and olive oil.  The group’s Edison unit generates and sells 
electric power and explores for and produces oil and gas. 
15   For further information on this political-financial infighting, see  The Economist, May 29
th, 1999 and 
Financial Times, July 31
st 2001. 
16   As noted earlier, Olivetti had already diversified decisively into telecoms services through its 
establishment of Omnitel, a mobile operator, and Infostrada, a wireline operator.  However, Colaninno 
saw Telecom Italia as a far bigger and more lucrative fish that still enjoyed monopoly power in parts of 
the Italian telecoms market.  He was therefore willing to sell Omnitel and Infostrada to Mannesmann, the 
German company also diversifying into telecoms services,  in order to raise funds for the acquisition of 
Telecom Italia and in order to satisfy the regulatory authorities.  
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into a union with the well-established tyre manufacturer, Dunlop, although this 
relationship was terminated in 1980. 
 
In 1982 Pirelli began producing optical fibre and optical fibre cables in Italy.
17  With the 
transition to digital transmissions systems this was to become a lucrative business.  Just 
prior to its decision to try and acquire Telecom Italia in 2001 Pirelli had sold parts of its 
fibre optics business to Cisco and Corning for a total of $6 billion that allowed Pirelli to 
accumulate a cash pile of around Euro 2.5 billion just as the global telecoms industry 
was in the process of collapsing.  It is true to say, therefore, that the competencies that 
Pirelli had accumulated over the years in cables (including optical fibre) and tyres 
provided the springboard to its diversification into the competence-unrelated area of 
telecoms services. 
 
The second company was the Benetton Group, seventy percent owned by the Benetton 
family.  Unlike Olivetti and Pirelli, Benetton was a relatively new Italian company 
having been established only in 1965 in Ponzano Veneto in Italy.  From the beginning 
the company’s main business was the retail selling of clothing, although it later 
diversified into related areas such as shoes and sporting goods.  Prior to June 1986 the 
company was wholly owned by the Benetton family.  From this date, however, the 
Benetton family, like many other business interests in Italy, decided that access to 
international capital markets was more important than complete financial control.   
Accordingly, shares representing about 11 percent of the company were sold in an 
initial public offering.  In June 1989 the group made a public offering on the New York 
Stock Exchange and in 1994 a global offering was made. 
 
From the late 1980s, however, the Benetton group began to run into difficulties.   
Franchisers of the group’s brand began to suffer as a result of Benetton’s relentless 
expansion, both in Italy and abroad, which brought strong competition.  By 2001 the 
Benetton group operated in 120 countries through 5,000 franchised Benetton stores, 
department stores, and company-owned and franchised megastores.  Furthermore, 
Benetton found itself challenged by a number of successful new brand-based 
competitors, such as Gap.  The company may also not have been helped by its creative 
but controversial advertising campaign that, for example, showed in advertisements a 
nun kissing a priest, a man dying of Aids, and the president of the group naked and 
asking for his clothes back. 
 
By the end of July 2001, when Pirelli and Benetton made their bid for Telecom Italia, 
Benetton’s shares had dropped to around $27 from a year high of $43, implying that the 
Benetton family had witnessed the value of their 70 percent holding in the group drop 
by some 40 percent.  These conditions, clearly, motivated the search for a more 
profitable area of business for the family’s accumulated fortunes. 
 
 
The Ripeness of the Takeover Fruit 
 
The Pirelli-Benetton move came at an opportune moment.  In effect, the takeover 
process was surprisingly simple.  Colaninno and his colleagues had done the necessary 
spadework.  The Achilles heel of their financial structure was the Bell holding company 
                                                 
17   For a detailed history of the invention of optical fiber for telecommunications, see M. Fransman, 
Japan’s Computer and Communications Industry, Oxford University Press, 1995.  
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that (as shown in Exhibit 1) held a controlling 23 percent share in Olivetti, which in turn 
held 55 percent of Telecom Italia.  The main investors in Bell were a small group of 
Colaninno’s allies who had also seen their investment ultimately in Telecom Italia as an 
attractive opportunity.  Unfortunately, however, both for themselves and for Colaninno 
this turned out not to be the case. 
 
With global sentiment turning markedly against the telecoms sector (as strongly as 
sentiment had been in favour of this sector until March 2000) Telecom Italia’s shares 
had been performing extremely badly.  Olivetti’s shares too, the company that formally 
owned Telecom Italia, had taken a battering.  From the time of Olivetti’s takeover of 
Telecom Italia in 1999 to July 2001 Olivetti’s shares had fallen by about 20 percent, 
leaving a group of disgruntled investors in Bell.  Colaninno tried to appease them 
through a major re-organisation of the company (discussed in detail below).   
 
However, this re-organisation, if it were ever to bear fruit, would take time to be 
effective.  But Colaninno’s former allies lacked patience.  Some of them had financed 
their investment in Bell through debt that had to be repaid.  Others were simply not 
willing to wait for Colaninno’s promised land, particularly since the global environment 
for telecoms had significantly worsened.  Under these conditions, an attractive offer 
from Marco Tronchetti Provera, the head of Pirelli, and Gilberto Benetton would be too 
hard to refuse.  And attractive the offer certainly was.  For their holdings in Bell the 
investors were offered a premium of 80 percent over the current market price.  Faced 
with such an incentive, the investors deserted their erstwhile ally, Colaninno. 
 
The delight of the investors in Bell, however, was matched by the dismay of the other 
minority shareholders in both Olivetti and Telecom Italia.  The reason was that none of 
them was entitled to the offer of an 80 percent premium for their shares and they were 
not consulted.  Under Italy’s Draghi takeover law (very similar to the corresponding law 
in the UK) an investor acquiring less than 30 percent of the equity of a company is not 
legally obliged to make a full offer for all the company’s shares. As noted earlier, 
Colaninno had fully exploited this legal provision in his takeover of Olivetti.   
 
The result, astoundingly, was that Tronchetti Provera and Gilberto Benetton were able 
to spend a mere Euro 7 billion ($6.1 billion) in order to acquire control of Telecom 
Italia, with a market capitalisation at the time of Euro 55 billion.  The total market 
capitalisation of the three companies that they now controlled – the Bell holding 
investment company, Olivetti, and Telecom Italia – was Euro 113 billion.  The 
Financial Times calculated that Pirelli and Benetton acquired control of Telecom Italia 
with less than 0.5 percent of its equity.
18 
 
Not surprisingly, the quality financial media had a field-day.  According to the New 
York Times, the acquisition of Telecom Italia “was just one more peculiar Italian 
exercise in capitalism without capital”.
19  Business Week saw it as “…a throwback to 
the opaque governance that dominated corporate Italy for decades…”
20.  According to 
the  Financial Times, “Roberto Colaninno’s reign at Telecom Italia has ended as it 
began: with abuse of minority shareholders.”
21  Another of the paper’s journalists 
                                                 
18   Financial Times, August 2
nd, 2001. 
19   New York Times, August 3
rd, 2001. 
20   Business Week, August 2
nd, 2001. 
21   Financial Times, July 30
th, 2001.  
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summed up his view on the matter:  “Clearly, old-style European capitalism still works 
with a vengeance in Italy; the future of companies is decided by a few rich men, not by 
institutions or by private investors.”
22 
 
What was more surprising was that although there were protests by some, mainly 
foreign, institutional investors, no shareholders meeting was called at which the large 
numbers of disenfranchised shareholders could voice their opposition (as had also been 
the case with the Colaninno takeover).  The reason, some analysts have suggested, is the 
absence in Italy of large pension funds and insurance companies that in countries such 
as the US or UK are likely to have exerted coordinated pressure at an early stage to have 
influenced the outcome (pressure such as was exerted to influence the re-structuring of 
both AT&T and BT).  Tronchetti Provera himself publicly admitted that his financial 
maneuver would probably not have worked in the UK with its influential pension funds.  
In Italy, in strong contrast, shareholders are widely dispersed and correspondingly 
difficult to organise. 
 
Deprived of an effective political voice, however, shareholders expressed their 
dissatisfaction in other ways.  Immediately after the announcement, shares in Pirelli fell 
by 16 percent and shares in Olivetti by 10 percent.  However, shares in Telecom Italia, 
Telecom Italia Mobile, and Seat-Pagine Gialle (the directories company merged with 
Tin.it, Telecom Italia’s internet company) rose around 3 to 4 percent in the hope that the 
changes in ownership might improve the fortunes of the company. 
 
Tronchetti Provera became chairman of Telecom Italia and Gilberto Benetton vice-
chairman.  Enrico Bondi became CEO of Telecom Italia and chairman of Telecom 
Italia.  (Born into a wealthy Milanese industrial family, Tronchetti Provera, graduate of 
Milan’s Bocconi University, began work in Camfin, his family’s heating oil 
transportation business.  In 1978 he married Cecilia Pirelli, daughter of Leopoldo 
Pirelli, the chairman of Pirelli.  In 1991 (by which time he had already divorced Cecilia 
Pirelli) he became managing director in Pirelli in charge of finance and administration 
and the following year became CEO of the company.  This followed a period of crisis in 
Pirelli after the company had failed in its bid for the more successful German car tire 
company, Continental.  The financial deal was handled by Mediobanca, the Milanese 
investment bank.  In restructuring Pirelli, Tronchetti Provera made the strategic decision 
to make optical fibre an area of priority.  As noted earlier, the sale of some of its 
investments in this area to Cisco and Corning gave Pirelli some of the finance it needed 
for the Telecom Italia acquisition.) 
 
 
The Financial Structuring of the Pirelli-Benetton Takeover 
 
The financial structuring of the Pirelli-Benetton was designed to control the structure 
that Colaninno had already put in place.   
 
Tronchetti Provera and the Benettons exercise their control through GPI, a holding 
company in which Pirelli holds 60 percent (through an investment of Euro 100 million) 
and Edizione Holding, the holding company 70 percent owned by the Benetton family, 
40 percent.  GPI owns 55 percent of Camfin. (Camfin was originally part of Tronchetti 
                                                 
22   Financial Times, July 30
th 2001.  
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Provera’s family’s oil business.  3.5 percent of Camfin is owned by Massimo Moratti, 
whose family also has oil interests and whose sister-in-law, Letizia, is a minister in 
Berlusconi’s centre-right government.)  In turn, Camfin owns 29.99 percent of Pirelli & 
C. which owns 33.4 percent of Pirelli S.p.A, the main Pirelli company that operates its 
cables and tires businesses.  Pirelli S.p.A owns 80 percent of a new company set up by 
Tronchetti Provera and the Bennetons, Olimpia.  Olimpia owns 100 percent of Bell.  
Bell, it will be recalled was established by Colaninno and his allies and it was the 
latter’s defection that allowed the Pirelli-Benetton takeover.  Bell, in turn, owns a 
controlling 23 percent of Olivetti, which owns 55 percent of Telecom Italia. 
 
This financial structure, however, while serving the desired purpose of facilitating 
control of Olivetti and Telecom Italia with a relatively small investment and only a tiny 
proportion of the shares of these two companies, is not without serious problems.  Of 
these one of the most serious is the conflict of interest between the indebted investors 
near the top of the chain and investors in the cash-rich operating companies (such as 
Telecom Italia and Telecom Italia Mobile) at the bottom.  These problems bedeviled 
Colaninno and are sure to continue troubling Tronchetti Provera and Gilberto Benetton.  
Adding strain to these conflicts is the continuing slide in the companies’ share prices.  
Between July 28
th, when the Pirelli-Benetton deal was announced, to September 27
th, 
Olivetti’s share price fell by 60 percent.  This prompted Tronchetti Provera to attempt to 
negotiate a slightly better (i.e. lower) price with the investors in Bell on the grounds that 
the value of the acquired assets had fallen so significantly. 
 
The surprise of the terrorist attack in New York on September 11
th added significantly 
to the uncertainty facing not only these companies, but all their counterparts in the 
world economy.  How long it will take for these investments to yield adequate returns, 





The last section has focused on the complicated changes in Telecom Italia’s ownership 
structure since the Olivetti takeover in 1999. But while ownership determines the 
distribution of gains made by a company, it is crucial to understand how these gains are 
generated in the first place.  To put the matter more crudely, apart from their financial 
manipulations, what did the rulers of Telecom Italia do for the company itself?  This 
key question will occupy the remainder of this paper.  The first step in answering it will 




Early Indications of the Pirelli-Benetton  
Approach in Managing Telecom Italia 
 
In analysing the Pirelli-Benetton takover of Telecom Italia it seems relatively clear that 
the prime motive was the acquisition of ownership and control over a set of income-
generating assets.  There was little indication that Tronchetti Provera and the Benettons 
made the acquisition in order to implement their own vision of where Telecom Italia 
should be going if it were to improve its performance.  This emerged implicitly when 
Tronchetti Provera was questioned immediately after the acquisition of Telecom Italia  
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was announced.  Asked about the absence of firm proposals for Telecom Italia in the 
announcements that he and his colleagues had made, Tronchetti Provera had the 
following to say: 
 
“I know we would be better off giving details, but I don’t want to make 




This was confirmed almost two months later when, during a presentation to analysts and 
reporters, Tronchetti Provera outlined strategic goals for Telecom Italia that, according 




Tronchetti Provera said that his “primary goal” for Telecom Italia would be to make the 
group net cash flow positive as soon as possible.  With an existing debt of Euro 17.4 
billion, Telecom Italia would sell up to Euro 5 billion worth of assets in the next two 
years, although he did not make clear what these assets would be.  With regard to more 
specific strategic goals he mentioned only two points.  The first was that Telecom Italia 
would concentrate on developing broadband and ADSL services within Italy that would 
give faster Internet access.  Secondly, Telecom Italia Mobile (TIM) would focus on so-
called 2.5 generation mobile technology – namely general packet radio switching 
(GPRS) – rather than third-generation UMTS technology.  Regarding the first strategic 
goal, Tronchetti Provera was merely following decisions that other European 
incumbents – such as Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom – had already announced.  
In spelling out the second goal, however, he was indicating a conservative approach to 
future mobile services, one that emphasised cost and profitability to a greater extent 
than being a market leader in offering exciting new services. 
 
It seems clear, therefore, that in the short run at least there will not be any sharp change 
in organisational or strategic direction for Telecom Italia under its new Pirelli-Benetton 
ownership.  It is therefore necessary to clarify the organisational and strategic changes 
that were brought about in Telecom Italia in the last year of Colaninno’s leadership.  
















                                                 
23   Financial Times, August 1
st, 2001. 
24   Financial Times, September 27, 2001.  
 
15
Telecom Italia’s Organisation in 2000 
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There were a number of glaring problems with this form of corporate organisation.  
First, each of the entities did not have sufficient autonomy to provide efficient, 
incentivised decision-making.  Secondly, the fixed-network business was not 
sufficiently separated from the mobile business.  Thirdly, international operations were 
not clearly distinguished so as to allow for a focus on foreign markets.  Finally, there 
was a confusion between function and market.  Specifically, Telecom Italia Mobile was 
responsible for mobile communications in Italy, but not internationally.  Clearly, 
something had to be done to correct these organisational defects.  Moreover, other 




In the latter half of 2000, under Colaninno’s leadership, Telecom Italia began the 
process of corporate re-organisation.  The changes in organisational structure that 
resulted are shown in Exhibit  5. 
 
 
                                                 









As shown in Exhibit 5, from 2001 under the corporate re-organisation, Telecom Italia 
has been organised as seven business units under a corporate organisation controlled by 
the Chairman, Marco Tronchetti Provera, the CEO, Enrico Bondi, and the company’s 
board.  According to Telecom Italia’s official description, the re-organisation has “led to 
the creation of [seven] autonomous Business Units, coordinated by a Corporate function 
with the responsibility for strategy and control.” 
 
In the following section the distribution of revenue, operating profit and income, and 
employment by business unit is analysed. 
 
 
Distribution of Revenue, Operating Profit and Income, 
and Employment by Business Unit 
 
The distribution of Telecom Italia’s sales and service revenue, operating profit and 





























Exhibit 6.  Telecom Italia: 
Distribution of Revenue, Operating Profit and Income, and Employment 
By Business Unit, 4



























































































16,323 6,404  3,210  109,377 
Source:  Telecom Italia Group, First Quarter Report, 2001, p5. 
 
 
Several important points about Telecom Italia emerge from Exhibit 6.  The first relates 
to the declining significance of wireline services and, correpondingly, the rising 
importance of mobile services (a feature common to all the major telecoms operator 
incumbents – see my other papers on BT, Deutsche Telekom, and France Telecom).  
Wireline services contributed 48 percent of sales and service revenues, 53 percent of 
gross operating profit, and 54 percent of operating income.  However, while mobile 
services provided 30 percent of sales and service revenues and 36 percent of gross 
operating profit, these services provided 45 percent of operating income – almost half.  
Furthermore, while wireline services employed 56 percent of the total workforce of 
Telecom Italia, mobile services employed only 14 percent (providing part of the 
explanation for the relatively high contribution of mobile services to operating income).  
In short, mobile makes a crucial contribution to Telecom Italia’s performance and 
growth, even though wireline services continue to be a ‘cash cow’ contributing to the 




The second point is the trivial contribution made by the Internet and media.  After all, 
Internet is, together with mobile, one of the growth areas in telecoms.  As will be shown 
in more detail later, in the section on Telecom Italia’s Internet activities in its business 
unit, the takeup of Internet access has been relatively low in Italy compared to other 
European countries (and, of course, even lower compared to the US).  In the last quarter 
of 2000, Internet/media contributed only 0.8 percent to sales and service revenues and 
made a gross operating loss and operating income loss.  However, this business unit 
employed a not-insignificant proportion of the company’s workforce – 7 percent.   
Whether this performance may improve in the future is considered in the section dealing 
with this business unit.   
 
Thirdly, international operations also make a relatively small contribution to operating 
income.  This business unit contributed 11 percent to total sales and service revenues, 8 
percent to gross operating profit, but only 2 percent to operating income.  However, 
international operations employed 11 percent of the company's workforce.  Clearly, if 
international operations are to become an important source of growth – as it certainly 
has become for France Telecom (see my chapter on France Telecom) – then Telecom 
Italia will have to perform much better in the future in this area. 
 
Fourthly, the story with IT services is similar to that for international operations.  IT 
services accounted for 8 percent of sales and service revenue, but only 3 percent of 
gross operating profit and 3 percent of operating income.  However, this business unit 
employed 11 percent of the company’s total workforce.  Like Deutsche Telekom (see 
my chapter on this company), Telecom Italia is trying to turn IT services into an 
important business area.  However, in the light of these figures one must wonder 
whether this telecoms company has a competitive advantage compared to the computer 
and software specialists. 
 
The fifth point deals with satellite services.  Mirroring the poor performance of the 
global satellite companies – such as Iridium, ICO, and Globalstar – that have failed to 
deliver in competition with land-based mobile operators, this business unit of Telecom 
Italia’s is also failing to deliver.   The figures speak for themselves.  Satellite services 
contributed 2 percent to total sales and service revenues, 1 percent to gross operating 
profit, but made an operating loss.  However, this business unit employs 1.1 percent of 
the company’s workforce. 
 
Finally, it is also clear that the Venture Capital and Innovation business unit – formerly 
the R&D division of Telecom Italia – is not making a good contribution to the 
company’s performance.  This business unit’s activities are analysed in more detail in a 
section below.  From the exhibit here it is apparent that this business unit contributed 
only 0.4 percent to total sales and services revenue and 0.06 to gross operating profit.  
However it too made an operating loss.  It employed 1.2 percent of Telecom Italia’s 
total workforce, about the same number as satellite services.  However, it must be added 
that, unlike any of the other business units, the innovation part of this business unit has 
not conventionally been conceived of as a business making a contribution to profit, but 
has been seen – as in the other incumbent telecoms operators – as a conventional 
corporate R&D function contributing indirectly to profit through providing technology 
inputs to the other business units.  The complications surrounding this business unit are 




In the following sections some of Telecom Italia’s seven business units are examined in 
more detail, starting with wireline, mobile and internet services. 
 
 




This business unit is divided into three areas: 
 
  Phone services (including residential, public and business) 
  Data.com (data and web services for business including ADSL) 
  Wholesale (responsible for the supply of infrastructures and network 
services to the commercial units of Telecom Italia and other telecom 
carriers) 
 
From April 2001 the Wireline Services business also assumed responsibility for 
international phone and data services and for the development of international networks 
for wholesale customers. 
 
Interestingly, unlike BT, that has separated wholesale activities in a distinct business 
and has contemplated spinning it off completely or floating it partially, Telecom Italia 
has made the organisational decision to keep wholesale as a part of a larger business 
unit, although as a separately identifiable area. 
 
It is clear that Telecom Italia is facing strong competition in Wireline Services.  This is 
evident from the fact that in the first quarter of 2001 there was a 13 percent decrease in 
revenue from traffic over a year previously as a result of price reductions and discount 
policies.  A reduction in costs, however, allowed for an improvement in both gross 
operating profit and operating income. 
 
In July 1999 Infostrada lodged a formal complaint with the Italian Antritrust Authority 
against Telecom Italia for alleged abuse of its dominant position in the supply of access 
services using ADSL technology.  The case was concluded on April 27
th, 2001 
(indicating how long it takes, and therefore how difficult and costly it is, for new 
entrants to challenge the dominant incumbent).  The result was that the authority 
ordered Telecom Italia to pay a penalty of Lire 115 billion (about $60 million).  This 
case also illustrates that while Telecom Italia does face increased competition from 
some parts of its Wireline Business Unit, it is still able to exercise quasi-monopoly 
power in other areas.  The Italian regulator has since obliged Telecom Italia to offer a 
wholesale plan to other carriers wanting to access the company’s ADSL local networks. 
 
 
Mobile Services – Telecom Italia Mobile (TIM) 
 
In contrast to the Wireline business unit, in the first quarter of 2001 the Mobile business 
unit increased revenue by 6.5 percent, gross operating profit by 13.5 percent, and 
operating income by 19.4 percent over the same quarter one year earlier.  In part this is  
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a reflection of the lower intensity of competitive pressure in mobile compared to many 
parts of the wireline market in Italy (see below). 
 
 
The European Mobile Market 
 
The European mobile market is shown in Exhibit 7. 
 
 

















57.8 30.7 53.1% 18.9% 
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57.8 25.15 43.5% 15.4% 
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81.3 24.5 30.1% 15.0% 
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Exhibit 7 shows several things about the European mobile market for the four largest 
European countries. The first is that Italy had by far the highest mobile penetration rate 
amongst the four countries. (Scandinavia, which had the highest penetration rates in the 
world, is left out of this exhibit.)  In Italy the rate was 53 percent.  The next country, the 
UK, had a penetration rate of 44 percent. Secondly, Italy’s share of the European market 
was 19 percent, compared to about 15 percent for the UK and Germany and 13 percent 
for France.  Thirdly, Germany, with a population of 81 million compared to about 58 
million for the other three countries (that have a remarkably similar population) had a 
lower absolute number of users than Italy and the UK.  One reason for the relatively 
high penetration of mobile users in Italy may be the relatively poor quality of the 














The Italian Mobile Market 
 
The Italian mobile market and the four competitors are shown in Exhibit 8. 
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Two points emerge from Exhibit 8.  First, TIM is the overwhelmingly dominant player 
in the Italian mobile market.  Even though its market share decreased from 60 percent to 
48 percent, it still has a far higher share than the second company, Omnitel with 35 
percent.  Secondly, the reason for the decline in the market share of TIM and Omnitel is 
the late entry of the third and fourth competitors, Wind and Blu, as is discussed in more 
detail below.  By April 2001 market penetration in Italy as a whole had increased to 74 
percent from 53 percent one year earlier. 
 
 




Telecom Italia Mobile was established in 1994 by Sip, the Italian monopolist 
incumbent.  The following year it became TIM. In 1997 TIM had its initial public 
offering with Telecom Italia left owning 52 percent of the company.   In the latter half 
of 2000, under the corporate reorganisation discussed earlier, TIM became one of the 
seven business units of Telecom Italia.  
 
As of February 28, 2001 the Italian Treasury owned 3.46 percent of Telecom Italia, 
which implies a small holding in TIM.  The declared intention, however, was to 
eliminate the Italian government’s holding in Telecom Italia completely.  Formally, 
TIM is an autonomous business unit within Telecom Italia with the latter retaining 
authority for overall strategy (within which TIM is supposed to formulate its own, 
consistent, strategy) and financial control.  In practice, however, as a senior TIM  
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executive made clear to me, the Chairman and CEO of Telecom Italia – that is, 
Tronchetti Provera and Gilberto Benetton – have de facto control over TIM.
26 
 
TIM was the first GSM operator in the world to begin operations.  It is the second-
largest Italian company in terms of market capitalisation, Fiat being the largest.  TIM is 
the only one of the four mobile operators to have been partly floated.  A large number of 





In an interview with the author, Mauro Sentinelli, the managing director of TIM (who 
has retained this position after the Pirelli-Benetton takeover, and who is de facto in 
charge of the company’s day-to-day activities), expressed his own personal views on the 
future of the European mobile industry and TIM’s role in it.  The following is a 
summary of some of the main issues that emerged from the discussion.
27 
 
In Sentinelli’s view, the global mobile communications industry operates under 
essential bandwidth constraints.  These constraints follow from the given fact that 
spectrum is limited.  This limitation is a physical fact even though technological 
advance (e.g. bandwidth compression techniques) can to some extent increase the 
capacity of existing spectrum.  The constraints are fundamentally different in the case of 
optical fibre networks.  These networks can be replicated in a way that spectrum cannot 
(and, of course, technological advance can also increase the carrying capacity of 
existing optical fibres e.g. through DWDM techniques that send multiple signals 
operating at different coloured wavelengths through the same fibre).  From this it is 
possible to conclude that mobile communications will always remain ‘narrowband’ 
while optical fibre is inherently ‘broadband’ in the sense that the total amount of 
bandwidth is constrained in the former case but essentially unconstrained in the latter 
case. 
 
For Sentinelli a number of important consequences follow from this given starting 
point.  Perhaps the most important implication is that the mobile industry will never be 
able to completely substitute for, and replace, the fixed optical-fibre based industry.  
Rather the two are fundamentally complementary, even though to some extent they are 
also at the same time substitutable.  (For example, in some cases a person will have a 
choice regarding whether to use a mobile phone or a fixed phone to make a voice call or 
send data, thus making mobile and fixed networks substitutable.) 
 
From this it follows that the mobile industry will continue to occupy a niche in the 
general field of communications.  That niche will largely be determined by the unique 
characteristics of mobile communications that cannot be substituted by fixed 
communications.  Specifically, the mobile industry offers two unique characteristics: the 
                                                 
26   Interestingly, he expressed the view that even with a the largest minority holding, Telecom Italia 
would still retain the same degree of control.  Of course, as made clear earlier, Olivetti and then Pirelli 
and Benetton have exerted their control over Telecom Italia on the basis of a controlling minority 
shareholding. 
27   This summary includes the author’s interpretation of Mr Sentinelli’s views as well as an independent 
elaboration on some of the implications.  For this reason it would be wrong to interpret these ideas as 
strictly reflecting Mr Sentinelli’s thinking.  
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ability to be mobile, and the ability to be located.
28  It is these two unique characteristics 
that determine the limits or boundaries of the ‘mobile niche’ in the ‘communications 
space’. 
 
Since bandwidth will always necessarily be more plentiful and therefore cheaper in 
optical fibre networks relative to mobile networks, it follows that there will be a 
tendency for ‘bandwidth-hungry’ content and applications to be distributed via the 
former networks.  The main exception is when the unique characteristics of mobile 
communications – mobility and ‘locatability’ – are a necessary part of the bundle of 
characteristics that the consumer is buying.  For example, the consumer who needs to 
see a video clip while on the move may need to use a mobile network rather than a fixed 
network, even though the latter is intrinsically more suitable for handling bandwidth-
hungry applications. 
 
This implies that both mobile and fixed networks will continue to occupy their own 
niches in the communications space.  The same is true of their services and also the 
equipment that they use.  Regarding their associated consumer appliances, mobile 
phones, PDAs (personal digital assistants), laptops, and desktops will all similarly 
occupy their specialist evolutionary niches, with bandwidth requirements generally 
increasing as we go up this list. 
 
There are a number of further implications that follow from this.  Given the 
complementarity of mobile and fixed networks (even though, as we have already noted, 
they are also to some extent substitutable), the question is raised regarding whether it is 
preferable to organise these two kinds of networks, and their complementarity and 
substitutability, within the same company, or whether they should be organised in 
separate companies with some combination of mechanisms for the separate companies 
to coordinate the networks and their services.   
 
To make this general issue more specific, some companies are ‘specialist mobile plays’ 
while others integrate internally mobile and fixed networks (and perhaps even other 
kinds of networks too).  Vodafone, the largest mobile operator in the world, is the best 
example of a specialist mobile play (although it also needs some fixed network capacity 
in its overall network).  Other telecoms companies are in the process of moving in the 
same direction.  Examples are mmO2 (formerly BT Wireless) that has been spun off 
from BT and therefore has become a specialist mobile play.  The story is similar with 
AT&T Wireless.  However, in other cases, all of which are of former monopoly 
incumbents, mobile networks and services are being integrated with fixed networks and 
services internally, i.e. within the same company.  Examples are Telecom Italia, NTT 
(with DoCoMo), Deutsche Telekom (with T-Mobile), and France Telecom (with 
Orange).  Which form of organisation is more efficient – specialisation in mobile versus 
mobile-fixed integration within the same company – remains to be seen, although it is 
possible to deduce theoretical arguments supporting each alternative. 
 
Sentinelli’s views on the relative importance of distribution and content are perhaps 
more controversial.  In his view, it is distribution rather than content that will generate 
revenue and profitability growth for mobile operators.  Content, he feels, will not be 
profitable, even though content may be necessary to attract the users and therefore 
                                                 
28   There is also a further characteristic that is also an important constraint, namely the necessarily small 
size of the mobile appliance’s display, the trade-off for small size, light weight, and mobility.  
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generate the demand for distribution.  The Internet has demonstrated clearly that it is 
very difficult and with very few exceptions (e.g. football games) to make content pay.  
DoCoMo’s i-mode illustrates the same point. Only a tiny fraction of profit comes from 
content itself, the bulk coming from distribution.  This implies that portals are likely to 
be important from a financial point of view only to the extent that they generate a 
demand for network distribution.  It also implies that stand-alone portals that are seen as 
profit centres and have to buy their network services are unlikely to be profitable.
29   
 
If Sentinelli is correct, a number of businesses will be in trouble.  These include 
Vizzavi, the multi-access portal owned by Vodafone and Vivendi, and T-Motion, the 
portal based in London owned by Deutsche Telekom’s T-Mobile and T-Online.   
Sentinelli’s thinking is in line with the recent announcement by BT Online, BT’s 
Internet business, that it will concentrate on broadband access provision, leaving content 
to specialist providers. 
 
How will TIM be able to compete with Vodafone?  Not only is Vodafone the largest 
mobile operator both in Europe and the world, it also owns Omnitel, the second largest 
mobile operator in Italy.  If, as Vodafone claims, its scale and the global extent of its 
operations translate into increased competitiveness, then surely TIM will face serious 
difficulties. 
 
Sentinelli, not surprisingly, disagrees.  Two of the competitive advantages that 
Vodafone claims it possesses according to Sentinelli are non-existent.  Vodafone argues 
that since it owns mobile networks in many countries in Europe and in the world it has 
the advantage of end-to-end control.  This will allow it to provide services more cheaply 
and of higher quality since it will not have to pay expensive roaming charges to other 
operators and quality will be better since its own engineers and operators will have end-
to-end control.   
 
Sentinelli, however, claims to have evidence that this argument is incorrect.  In Europe 
Vodafone began offering a one-price tariff that allowed customers to call anywhere in 
Europe for the same price.  However, "when we found out about this I phoned some of 
my European friends and we agreed that we would offer a similar service through 
cooperation.  So one week after Vodafone’s service was launched we began the same 
thing, except our price was slightly lower.  Some large firms in Italy were furious with 
Vodafone who had incorrectly given the impression that only they could offer this kind 
of service.” 
 
The second advantage that has sometimes been claimed by Vodafone is the Europe-
wide content that its joint-venture portal, Vizzavi, offers.  (Vizzavi aims to have both 
Europe-wide content as well as country-specific content where necessary.  The ability to 
offer Europe-wide content, it is argued, is extremely attractive for service, content and 
application developers since it would give them access to a far larger market.   
Companies such as TIM, France Telecom’s Orange, and Deutsche Telekom’s T-Mobile, 
                                                 
29   It is interesting to compare the views on content of Dr Keiji Tachikawa, president of DoCoMo.  
According to an article in the Financial Times, Dr Tachikawa “said European operators did not yet 
understand the right business model for data services.  ‘It is important to figure out how to develop 
attractive content and convince content providers to do so.  Western [operators] still don’t understand that 
very well,’ he said.”  (September 27
th , 2001.)  
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it is suggested, are not able to offer Europe-wide content because they operate in few 
countries compared to Vodafone.) 
 
In Sentinelli’s view, however, all content will be country-specific, eliminating this as a 
potential source of competitiveness for Vodafone.  He gives as evidence the very 
different appearance of the different portals in different countries, not only in terms of 
language, but also culture-bound design. 
 
As is implicitly clear from this discussion, TIM’s strategy is to find its mobile niche in 
the communications space and, through cooperation with the other Telecom Italia 
business units, realise the synergies that follow from complementarity.  The overall aim 
of the game is to generate as much revenue and profit as possible from distribution.  A 
further goal is to replicate this business model in other parts of Europe and in Latin 
America.  TIM’s interests in these areas are discussed in the following sub-section. 
 
TIM’s Main European and Latin American Interests 
 
By the end of 2000, TIM’s foreign lines were greater in absolute number than its Italian 
lines.  The ratio of foreign to Italian lines was 108:100.
30  TIM’s European and Latin 
American interests, containing all its foreign interests, are shown in Exhibits 9 and 10 
respectively.  Of TIM’s total foreign interests by line at the end of 2000, 79 percent 
were in Europe while 21 percent were in Latin America. 
 
 
Exhibit 9.  TIM’s European Interests























Source: Telecom Italia, Annual Report 2000, p.47 
 
                                                 
30   Telecom Italia, Annual Report 2000, p.49.  It is not clear from this source, however, whether the data 
on which this ratio is based adjusts for TIM’s proportional ownership of the foreign mobile companies.  
One assumes it does. 
31   Note that some of Telecom Italia’s mobile interests are held directly by Telecom Italia and not 
through TIM.  Exhibits 9 and 10 refer only to TIM’s direct foreign mobile assests.  Where foreign mobile 
assets are owned directly by Telecom Italia, they are recorded under the International Operations business 
unit.  However, the latter are not very significant.  For further details, see Telecom Italia, Annual Report, 
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As shown in Exhibit 9, TIM has a majority holding in only one company, in Greece, 
although it also has a 49 percent holding in Turkey.  TIM is not well represented in the 
three largest and wealthiest European countries.  In France it has an 11 percent holding 
in Bouygues Telecom but no holdings at all in Germany and the UK.  In Spain TIM has 
a 7 percent holding while of the smaller, wealthier European countries TIM is 
represented only in Austria with a 25 holding. 
 
In Latin America, as Exhibit 10 shows, TIM has made its major commitment in Brazil 
with majority holdings in three regional companies.  TIM also has majority stakes in 
Peru and Venezuela.  
 
As was seen in Exhibit 6, the International Operations business unit contributed 11 
percent to TIM’s revenue and 2 percent to its operating income.  But since the company 
now has more lines overseas than it does in Italy, this contribution is likely to rise in the 



















In Exhibit 8, the market share of the four Italian mobile companies is shown.  In this 
subsection more details are given of the startup and ownership of TIM’s three 
competitors.  A summary of these details is provided in Exhibit 11. 
 
 














June  1990 
 
























As can be seen from Exhibit 8, Omnitel is the second-largest mobile operator in terms 
of market share after TIM.  As noted earlier, Olivetti, the main shareholder in Omnitel, 
had to sell the company when it acquired Telecom Italia.  Omnitel was sold to 
Mannesmann which, in turn, was acquired by Vodafone.  Omnitel, therefore, is 
currently owned by Vodafone. 
 
Wind began operations in December 1997 as a joint venture of Enel, the Italian 
electricity company, France Telecom and Deutsche Telekom.  In July 2000, after 
Deutsche Telekom was beaten by Olivetti in its bid for Telecom Italia (its secret 
dealings causing a fundamental split with its former ally, France Telecom), Deutsche 
Telekom pulled out of the Wind joint venture with France Telecom taking over its 
share.  In May 2001, Wind acquired Infostrada, a fixed-network company originally set 
up in 1995 by Olivetti, but also sold to Mannesmann in June 1999 after Olivetti’s 
acquisition of Telecom Italia. In April 2000, Infostrada was acquired by Vodafone. 
   
The acquisition of Infostrada makes Wind an integrated mobile-fixed-internet company.  
In October 1998 Infostrada acquired Italia On Line (IOL), not linked with AOL, which 
was one of Italy’s most successful portals.  In 1999 Infostrada launched Libero, a highly 
successful free internet access service (similar to Freeserve in the UK, eventually 




Blu is the most recent of the four Italian mobile operators, beginning commercial 
operations only in May 2000.  Autostrade, the Italian motorways company, is the main 
shareholder with a 32 percent stake, while BT was the main technology provider (until 
BT sold its stake as part of its restructuring and debt reduction programme).  The 
Benetton family owned 7 percent of Blu which it had to sell following the Pirelli-
Benetton acquisition of Telecom Italia.  Blu is by far the weakest of the four operators, 
largely as a result of the uncertainty caused by the withdrawal of BT and Benetton. 
 
 
Italy’s 3G Mobile Licenses
32 
 
A major event that took place in Italian mobile telecoms was the allocation of third-
generation licenses in 2000.  This event, that will shape the future of the Italian mobile 
telecoms industry, was fraught with conflict and political intrigue.  In this subsection the 
3G license issue will be briefly summarised. 
 
The first problem that faced the Italian government was whether to opt for an auction or 
a ‘beauty contest’ as the mechanism for allocating the 3G licenses.  While many 
thought, like the British and Germans, that an auction was a preferable mechanism
33, 
there was a serious downside problem.  This was the Italian fear that foreign companies 
would, in general, be able to pay more than Italian companies for the licenses and would 
therefore take over the Italian mobile industry. 
 
After long and heated conflict and debate it was eventually decided that a hybrid 
process would be adopted involving two stages.  In the first stage applicants would be 
selected on the basis of their reliability and quality of their business plan.  In effect, this 
would give the Italian authorities a significant degree of political control over the 
outcome.  In the second stage an auction would be held similar in structure to that 
organised in the UK.  The Italian authorities were also motivated by the significant 
sums that 3G auctions had raised in both Britain and Germany. 
 
There were six companies that entered the auction process in October 2000.  They and 















                                                 
32   This subsection makes use of excellent research assistance from Andrea Gallice. 
33   For more details on the pros and cons of auctions, see M. Fransman and other related articles in 
http://www.TelecomVisions.com   
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Exhibit 12.  The Six Companies Entering the  
Italian 3G Mobile Auction, October 2000 
 
COMPANY  MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS (%) 
 
TIM   Telecom Italia (60.1%) 
 
Omnitel   Vodafone (100%) 
 
Wind  Enel (73.4%), France Telecom (26.6%) 
 
Blu  Autostrade (32%), BT (20%), Distacom 
(9%), Edizione (9%), Mediaset (9%) 
 
Ipse 2000  Telefonica (45.6%), Sonera (12.6%), Atlanet 
(12%), Banca di Roma (10%) 
 
Andala (now H3G)  Hutchison Whampoa (51%), Tiscali 




The Italian auction began on Thursday, October 19
th 2000 at 2 p.m.  However, it began 
in an atmosphere of uncertainty and disquiet.  The reason was that it became known that 
there were tensions within the Blu camp.  The reason was that BT, the main 
technological provider to the consortium, some time previously had agreed informally 
with its partners to increase its share of the jointly owned company to 51 percent.  The 
other shareholders, including Autostrade with the largest minority holding of 32 
percent, wanted to decrease their holding in the company.  However, BT had since run 
into severe financial problems, partly as a result of falling profitability in its core long-
distance and international businesses and partly the result of its indebtedness following 
the price it paid for its 3G auctioned licenses in Britain and Germany.  As a result BT 




Just two hours before the beginning of the auction, however, Blu confirmed, to the 
delight of the Italian authorities, its participation in the auction.  Since there were six 
bidders for a total of five licenses it was essential that all six companies participate.  Blu 
stayed in the auction until the tenth round on the second day.  It then, on Saturday 
afternoon, officially requested a suspension of the competition (which, according to the 
rules, it was entitled to do).  The suspension was accepted until 9:30 a.m. on the 
following Monday, giving Blu a weekend to try and resolve its internal difficulties. 
 
However, at 9:30 a.m. Blu announced that it was withdrawing from the auction.  The 
Italian authorities had no option but to stop the auction and award the five licenses to 
the five remaining bidders.  However, this did not stop the controversy.  Clearly, the 
remaining five bidders were the great winners, getting their licenses for far less that 
everyone had anticipated in the light of the previous British and German auctions.  The 
                                                 
34   See my paper on BT for a more detailed account of the Blu affair.  
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Italian government and taxpayers generally were dismayed, since the return to the 
government from license fees was far less than expected.  Some argued that Blu had 
been involved in collusion with some or all of the other bidders.  There was talk of a 
court case against Blu for its alleged collusion.  In the event, however, an administrative 
court decided that Blu could not be punished because it had respected the rules of the 
auction.  BT subsequently pulled out of Blu as part of its global restructuring in order to 
reduce its high level of indebtedness.  To add to the ironies, by the end of 2001 there 
was a clear consensus, in the light of the bursting of the global telecoms financial 
bubble, that European companies had overpaid for their 3G licenses.  Indeed, in Finland 




TIM’s Cooperation with DoCoMo 
 
TIM announced on January 18
th 2001 that it had entered into a joint venture with KPN 
Mobil N.V. and NTT DoCoMo to provide mobile Internet services across Europe.  The 
intention, initially, was to offer games, exchange of messages and images, and a number 
of Internet-based transactions in Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium.  The 
handsets used would be combined i-mode/WAP handsets.  On January 29 2001, TIM 
signed a protocol agreement with DoCoMo and Sony Computer Entertainment Inc. to 





As shown in Exhibit 5, Internet/Media is one of Telecom Italia’s seven business units.  
In Exhibit 6, however, it can be seen that this business unit in the last quarter of 2000 
contributed only 0.8 percent to revenue.  Furthermore, it made both a gross operating 
loss and an operating income loss. 
 
It is worth noting that the Internet has been relatively weak in Italy as a whole.  In 2000 
only 9.2 percent of the Italian population had access to the Internet, compared to an 
average of 17 percent for Europe as a whole. 
 
Not surprisingly, Telecom Italia has made it a priority to strengthen its position in the 
Internet area which is one of the fastest-growing telecoms market segments.  In 
February 2000, Telecom Italia announced that it had reached agreement for an eventual 
incorporation of Seat Pagine Gialle (Seat Yellow Pages), a popular Internet portal and 
directory (in which Telecom Italia already had an 11 percent holding).  Accordingly, on 
November 15
th 2000, Tin.it, Telecom Italia’s Internet business, was incorporated into 
Seat Pagine Gialle, creating Italy’s leading Internet service provider.  In addition, 
according to Telecom Italia’s First Quarter Report, 2001, “the Seat group oversees the 




It may be, however, that politics will influence the outcome of Seat’s involvement in 
television.  During the takeover of Telecom Italia by Pirelli and Benetton, Tronchetti 
                                                 
35   P. 20.  
 
31
Provera indicated that, in order to avoid conflict with Prime Minister Berlusconi’s 
television interests, he may be willing for Seat to drop its entry into television, an entry 
that Berlusconi’s media interests had vigorously opposed.  (Seat had bought an Italian 
television company – Telemontecarlo - with a view to challenging Rai and Mediaset, 
two key parts of the Berlusconi media empire.  However, partly because of the 




Telecom Italia’s Portals 
 
TIM has its own portal (www.i-tim.it).  Interestingly, however, it is not integrated with 
Seat’s portal, VirgilioTin (www.vtin.virgilio.it).  For example, there are no cross-links 
between these two portals.  (Seat acquired Virgilio, a successful Italian portal that was 
also the most used Italian search engine.)  The lack of integration of the two portals 
seems to be an indication of the autonomy of Telecom Italia’s mobile and internet 
business units, but it may also be an indication of the absence of cooperation and 






TILAB is one of Telecom Italia’s seven business units.  Telecom Italia defines TILAB’s 
activities as ‘venture capital and innovation’.  According to Telecom Italia’s annual 
report, TILAB “is reponsible for both identifying, managing and making the best 
possible use of new initiatives in the sector of Information & Communications 
Technology (ICT) and for coordinating the research, development and innovation 
projects of the Telecom Italia Group.”
36 
 
It is clear that TILAB is but one example of a far wider trend that is affecting all the 
R&D-performing telecoms incumbent operators in Western countries.
37  In view of the 
importance of this trend, personal interviews were held with some of TILAB’s leaders.  
The rest of this section contains a summary of these discussions. 
 
The trend referred to stems from the great pressure that is being put on the R&D 
function in the R&D-performing incumbents to contribute to the profit generated by the 
company as a whole.  As I have analysed elsewhere
38, the incumbents’ profits have been 
eroded by strong competition, most particularly in the area of fixed long-distance and 
international voice and data.  The downturn in profitability, often aggravated by 
increasing indebtedness, has created enormous pressure within these companies to 
restore profitability.  The R&D function has not escaped this pressure.  Although not 
traditionally regarded as a business or a profit centre, but rather regarded as a key 
support function whose contribution to the company’s businesses has been in the form 
of inputs to innovation, in the past R&D laboratories have tended to be largely funded 
from corporate as opposed to business sources.  In companies such as Telecom Italia, 
BT and AT&T this model for R&D has now been abandoned.   
                                                 
36   Telecom Italia, First Quarter Report, 2001, p.24. 
37   See my studies of AT&T, BT, Deutsche Telekom, and France Telecom. 




Telecom Italia’s response to this pressure has involved the following.  First, TILAB has 
been established as a separate business unit and profit centre that, as noted, combines 
the functions of technology support, technology commercialisation, and venture capital.  
It is the addition of venture capital to the conventional functions of R&D and the 
addition of an enhanced role in actively commercialising the outputs from R&D that 
Telecom Italia claims constitutes its distinctiveness.  This claim to distinctiveness is 




Exhibit 13.  How We Differentiate Ourselves 
 
  Capital 
 
  Strategic consultancy 
 
  Technology support 
 
  Marketing support 
 
  Roll-out support 
 
  Go-to market support 
 
 





It is significant that of the six areas identified in Exhibit 13 as constituting the total field 
of TILAB’s responsibility, only one is a traditional R&D function, namely technology 
support.  The first two areas – capital and strategic consultancy – TILAB sees as being 
the ‘traditional VC’s [ie venture capitalist’s] focus’.  The last three areas clearly go 
beyond the traditional R&D function into what might be called the ‘commercialisation 
of R&D’.  Hitherto, these three functions were the sole responsibility of the relevant 















Exhibit 14 shows the national and global extent of TLAB’s R&D activities. 
 
 
Exhibit 14.  TILAB’s National and Global Activities 
 
TELECOM ITALIA: TILAB 
 
TITLE LOCATION  FUNCTION 
 





Turin, Rome, Naples, Sicily    Technology labs 






Turin, Rome, Venice 
San Francisco 
  Economic analyses of 
technology and market 
innovation, scenario 
building and socialisation 
 
Consumer Lab  Rome    Marketing support with 
product testing services 
and consumer innovative 
services 
 
San Francisco  San Francisco    Scout for innovation & hi-
tech companies (Silicon 
Valley) 
 
New York  New York    Scout for innovation & hi-
tech companies 
(Boston/Route 128) 





In searching for a new role, TILAB’s discussions included the desirability of going 
outside Telecom in the search for innovations and innovative companies.  These 
discussions then raised the issue of whether Telecom Italia could benefit by also taking 
a venture capital stake in the companies located.  Telecom Italia already had a venture 
capital unit, but its activities were not integrated with those of the R&D laboratories.  It 
was eventually decided that the activities of R&D and innovation and venture capital 
were complementary and could be integrated into a separate business unit – hence 
TLAB that officially began in March 2001.  Although BT’s Brightstar also has 
responsibility for spinning-off companies emerging from its R&D, this is confined to 
non-core areas.  TLAB, in contrast, will also spin-offf companies in core areas.   
Furthermore, TLAB will also be proactive in locating potential innovative companies 




As part of these activities, on April 26, 2001 TILAB and Ramius Capital Group, an 
American management company, set up Saturn Venture Partners.  This joint venture is a 
US registered venture capital fund that will manage $280 million.  Other investors in the 
venture include TIM, Olivetti, Hopa and Mediobanca.  The fund, based in New York, 
will invest mainly in the US in the technological and telecoms sector. 
 
The current CEO of TILAB is Andrea Granelli born in 1960.  Granelli’s background is 
atypical of the classical R&D background which in the incumbent R&D laboratories has 
traditionally involved university research in science or engineering followed by research 
in the incumbent’s central R&D laboratories followed by a career in the management of 
R&D.  Although Granelli did research at the CNR, the Italian national research council, 
in the areas of IT and Biotech, he then joined McKinsey, the consultancy company, in 
1989.  In 1995 he joined Video On Line, the first Italian ISP, as general manager.  In 
July 1996 he joined Telecom Italia as sales and marketing manager for Tin (Telecom 






The profitability pressures that have motivated TILAB to move in the direction it has – 
attempting to combine venture capital and the commercialisation of R&D with the 
traditional function of providing R&D support for the company’s businesses – are 
understandable.  However, this is not to say that the move in this direction is necessarily 
desirable or profitable. 
 
Several questions may be raised.  The first is whether it is possible for TILAB to 
simultaneously achieve these three objectives: traditional R&D support for the other 
business units (e.g. TIM which does not have its own R&D labs);  commercialisation of 
the company’s R&D;  and venture capital business.  At the very least it must be asked 
whether there is not a trade-off between these three objectives.  For example, in order to 
achieve the second and third objectives will TILAB not be sacrificing some of its 
traditional activity of providing R&D support to the other business units?  And if there 
is a tradeoff, does the gain from objectives two and three outweigh the loss of 
achievement under objective one? 
 
Secondly, what reason is there to believe that Telecom Italia in general and TILAB in 
particular have much to offer in the area of venture capital?  This is itself a specialised 
business area requiring specialist competencies.  Telecom Italia’s competencies, and 
TILAB’s traditional telecoms incumbent R&D competencies, may not be particularly 
relevant in the area of venture capital.   
 
However, while these two sets of questions do seem relevant, it remains to be seen how 









REGULATION AND TELECOM ITALIA’S 
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL BUSINESSES 
 
 
Regulation of Telecom Italia and the Italian telecoms industry is governed by Italian 
Law No. 249/1997, that instituted the Regulatory Body of the Communications 
Authority, and by Presidential Decree No. 318/1997, that implemented directives at the 
level of the European Union.  As with the other member countries of the European 
Union, there are continuing tensions between the role of the National Regulatory 
Authority and the regulatory role of the various parts of the Brussels bureaucracy. 
 
Of particular interest is the question of the relationship between Telecom Italia’s 
wholesale and retail businesses.  This relationship is of interest precisely because 
Telecom Italia retains de facto monopoly control over many parts of its wholesale 
telecoms network.  As with many of the other European incumbents, Telecom Italia has 
frequently been accused of abusing its de facto monopoly power.  These accusations 
have involved, for example, issues of interconnection charges and access to the Telecom 
Italia controlled local loop. 
 
As was shown in the discussion on the Wireline Services business unit, ‘wholesale’ is 
one of three areas under the control of this unit.  Although Telecom Italia may have 
considered the question internally, there has been little discussion in the public domain 
regarding the wisdom of separating the wholesale network as a distinct business unit.  
The European incumbent where this option has been most vocally and most publicly 
debated is BT.  For some time, as part of its restructuring in 2001, BT discussed the 
possibility of separating its wholesale network, which had already been restructured as a 
distinct business unit.  The suggestion was that this business unit, called Netco, could be 
either wholly or partially floated.  Indeed, this discussion stimulated two groups to make 
offers for BT’s wholesale network.  The first was Earth Lease, a consortium led by the 
US finance group, Babcock and Brown.  Its bid was for BT’s local network.  The 
second group, WestLB, a German bank, was interested in buying all of BT’s network 
assets.  In September 2001, however, BT announced that it had abandoned plans to sell-
off its wholesale network.  The apparent reason was that the financial pressure on BT 
had been reduced by its recent record-breaking special rights issue.  This implies that, 
financial pressure aside, BT saw little intrinsic merit in the separation. 
 
Interestingly, also in September 2001, although a little earlier than the BT 
announcement, it was stated in the media that Italy’s telecoms ministry was considering 
plans to separate Telecom Italia’s wholesale network from the rest of the company.  The 
separated ‘netco’ company would be open to outside investors.
39  Whether these plans 
will be taken further, especially in the light of BT’s reconsideration of the wholesale 
issue, is not clear at the time of writing. 
 
 
THE FUTURE OF TELECOM ITALIA 
 
Telecom Italia is of particular interest since so far it is the only one of the large 
European incumbents to be acquired by private sector companies.  It is true that the 
                                                 
39   Financial Times, September 18
th, 2001.  
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acquisition processes – involving first Olivetti and then Pirelli-Benetton – have been 
very much influenced by Italian institutions.  This was a major theme of the present 
paper.  However, the tendency to regard the incumbent telecoms operators, or even parts 
of them, merely as financial assets about which decisions should be made in precisely 
the same way as any financial asset, represents a significant change from the times 
when telcos were regarded as government owned or sponsored utility providers.  The 
bids for parts of BT’s wholesale network from financial consortia, discussed in the 
previous section, are indications of the same trend.  How far this trend will eventually 
go and what the outcome will be in terms of the reshaping of the European telecoms 
operator incumbents remains to be seen. 
 
As for Telecom Italia, it is clear from this paper that its recent past has been shaped by 
takeover battles.  This has left the company with a potentially unstable financial 
structure.  This structure has not satisfied many minority shareholders and, as Tronchetti 
Provera and Gilberto Benetton clearly showed, leaves Telecom Italia vulnerable to a 
similar takeover in the future.  The extent to which Telecom Italia’s managers have had 
their attention and resources diverted from the ‘business of telecoms’ towards the 
‘battles of financial markets’, and the cost thereof, can only be wondered at. 
 
 